

The Use of United States Military Force in the Post Cold War Era

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15 May 1998

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 23.Feb.00	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MAJOR REPORT	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 1) THE USE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 2) NASA: INTERNATIONAL TRAINING AND INTEGRATION OFFICE IMPROVING INTERACTION AND COOPERATION WITH THE			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) 2D LT REED KIM N				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) UNIVERSITY OF READING			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AFIT/CIA, BLDG 125 2950 P STREET WPAFB OH 45433			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER FY00-84	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited distribution In Accordance With AFI 35-205/AFIT Sup 1			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 143	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	

Preface

The subject of military force in the post Cold War era is not a new subject. However, I have attempted to take a unique perspective by focusing this dissertation on the new security environment in which the military is forced to do more with less. This dissertation is important both from a personal perspective and from a broader international perspective. As a military officer, I have found that many members of the armed forces do not understand the rationale behind decisions made that affect the military. At the same time, many of these decisions are made by political leaders who do not have a complete awareness of how the military functions. For the best possible outcome in any given situation, it is important that both military and political leaders understand military capabilities as well as the political and environmental factors that influence decisions concerning the use of military force. Increased cooperation between military and political organizations can only increase the overall effectiveness of military intervention. In analyzing the use of military force, my intention is to identify means to improve the decision making process so as to better meet the needs and demands of a constantly changing security environment.

It is important to point out here that there are many different responses to conflict. This dissertation focuses only on the use of force. If a conflict can be prevented in its early stages, then military force may not have to be used at all. For a complete evaluation of conflict responses, it is essential to assess options other than military force.¹

* * *

I would like to thank my supervisor, Andrea Ellner, and Professor Charles Hauss for their guidance and for taking the time to assist me with this dissertation.

* * *

Although I have written this dissertation from a military perspective, the views expressed in this report are personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

* * *

I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been properly identified and that no material is included for which a degree has been conferred upon me.

Signed: Kim N. Reed

Date: 15 May 98

¹Explanations and analysis of possible responses to conflict can be found in Hauss, *Beyond Confrontation*, esp. pp. 131-148, in Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, in Zartman and Rasmussen, *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, in Crocker and Hampson, *Managing Global Chaos*, and in the Carnegie Endowment report, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*.

Introduction

The international security environment has experienced vast changes since the end of the Cold War. As a result of these changes, a conflict has developed in the United States between political and military organizations regarding the role of armed forces and the use of military force. The military frequently takes the position that its primary responsibility is national defense. This dissertation supports that position. Although the armed forces can be used for broader missions, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the use of military force should not be authorized if it threatens the military's ability to maintain national defense. The post Cold War environment has presented the United States military with the additional challenge of doing more with less. Since the end of the Cold War, the military's resources and personnel have decreased while the number of military operations have increased. Because the United States is the leading superpower, the international community expects the United States to respond to conflicts. However, there must be guidelines for deciding when to authorize the use of military force to ensure that the military is not stretched beyond its limits of effectiveness. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger has pointed out, "America must be selective in its actions. It cannot take on all the world's troubles."¹ In a constantly changing security environment, it is essential that political and military leaders have guidelines to follow when making the difficult decision of authorizing the use of military force. This dissertation provides guidelines for the authorization of military force in the post Cold War era.

During the Cold War, United States strategic and force planning was primarily based on the political objective to reign in the Soviet military threat and to contain the spread of communism. The use of military force was limited to avoid direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.² In the post Cold War era, however, it is difficult to clearly define the threats facing the United States. In addition, the U.S.-

Soviet hostilities that imposed limits on the use of force during the Cold War have been removed. Despite the removal of Cold War constraints, the post Cold War domestic and international environments present their own limits for the use of military force. The United States currently faces domestic constraints due to limited resources and funding and a growing consensus among the American public that domestic needs must come first. The international environment has also imposed constraints on United States military action. Since the end of the Cold War, powerful states have been more likely to challenge United States actions and former adversaries have not necessarily been assured partners.³ As a result of these shifts in the post Cold War environment, the United States requires new guidelines for the authorization of military force.

The guidelines recommended in this dissertation reflect the principles of military strategist, Karl von Clausewitz:

[T]o discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war may have on them.⁴

The United States can benefit from this framework introduced by Clausewitz. The United States Government must examine its objectives prior to intervention and ensure that the objectives are clearly defined and identifiable. Without clear political objectives, the military will not be able to link its military objectives to a specific political outcome. In evaluating a conflict, the military must assess the adversary's ability and evaluate whether or not the government will commit the resources required for a successful operation. If the government is unable or unwilling to commit wholeheartedly to an operation, then it may be best not to intervene at all. The military must be given the opportunity to succeed if the government is going to put its

troops lives in danger. The government must also analyze the level of congressional and public support for the operation. Support from Congress and the American public increases the morale of the troops which can potentially increase the overall effectiveness of an operation. In addition, congressional support will ensure funding for the operation so that the objectives can be achieved. Finally, the United States Government must examine the potential ramifications of military intervention, both domestically and internationally. The results of military force should be more beneficial than the damage caused in intervention to ensure support from the domestic and international environment. An accurate assessment of these guidelines will assist American policy makers in deciding whether or not to authorize the use of military force.

This dissertation is important for a number of reasons. During the Cold War, there was controversy at times between political and military leaders regarding the effective and legitimate use of force. Most of the conflicts came as a result of a lack of communication and understanding between political and military organizations. Political leaders would often receive strong opposition from military leaders if they were not involved in critical decisions regarding the armed forces. As Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, when the military was "excluded from the formation of policy, the military felt little obligation to support that policy, whatever its substantive merits, and often encouraged Congressional challenges."⁵ To achieve a successful outcome in any conflict, both political and military leaders must be able to understand how the decisions they make could potentially affect the political or military standing of the United States. It is all too often that decisions are made without accurately assessing their effect. According to John Hillen, political analyst with the Heritage Foundation, "When policy makers act without goals and priorities, they have no criteria for deciding when to use military force. Consequently, they have no methodology for addressing the complex set of issues that surround the political and

military questions involved in strategic and military policy."⁶ This dissertation attempts to resolve these problems by providing guidelines for the United States to follow when authorizing the use of military force in the post Cold War era. These guidelines will serve as a framework to help policy makers work through the issues of why, when, where, and how to use military force.

This dissertation begins by analyzing the international environment and the role of international law in the use of military force. Chapter two examines previous criteria for intervention and analyzes how American policy makers created criteria for authorizing the use of military force. Chapter three looks at the contemporary environment in which the United States is attempting to do more with less and why this environment requires guidelines for the use of military force. Next, chapter four presents the recommended guidelines for the use and authorization of United States military force. These guidelines are based on the analysis of past criteria and on the demands of the new security environment. Finally this study concludes in chapter five with an examination of four case studies, two from the Cold War era and two from the post Cold War era. The analysis of these case studies affirms the need for new criteria in the post Cold War environment. The case studies also demonstrate why the guidelines presented in this dissertation are essential elements in determining whether or not to authorize military force.

Chapter I:

The International Environment and the Use of Force

During the Cold War, the United States was rarely affected by international law concerns, and the law was often interpreted to justify intervention under Cold War constraints. Now, even without the constraints of the Cold War, there are still multiple interpretations of international law regarding the use of force. In addition to problems relating to international law, the post Cold War environment also faces increased security concerns as a result of the growth of rogue states and the more frequent occurrence of state fragmentation. The lack of authority in international law and the increased security concerns in the post Cold War period make the calculation and analysis of whether to intervene more difficult. Thus, the United States needs guidelines for the authorization of military force to assess when it should intervene.

The international environment plays an important role in the use of force, and the United States must thoroughly assess the international implications of military force before it embarks on intervention. The use of military force has been a prevalent occurrence in international affairs throughout history and "the daily presence of force and recurrent reliance upon it mark the affairs of nations."⁷ Furthermore, there is extreme decentralization in the international community as states coexist in conditions of anarchy. There is no international force with an effective monopoly to resolve disputes among states, to prevent the use of force, or to punish law breakers if necessary.⁸ As explained by Professor Robert Leiber, there is "no common power, no overall arbiter or institution to which [states] can turn for settlement of dispute, for enforcement of their rights, or even for effective protection of their basic security and survival."⁹

This need for an international force intensified in the aftermath and devastation of World War II. The United Nations Charter was drafted with the intention of

making war both illegal and impossible. It was hoped that the charter would deter the need for military force by altering the anarchic nature of the international community. Article 2(4) of the charter requires that all member states "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."¹⁰ Article 51 also deals with the use of force, but establishes an exception to the rule of the use of force: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."¹¹ Thus, the combined articles do not outlaw all aggressive acts, especially in self-defense cases. However, it is extremely difficult to cover every aspect concerning the legitimacy of the use of military force, and the charter can not provide guidelines for every conflict that will transpire. As a result, there have been multiple interpretations regarding international law and the use of force.

These varying interpretations of international law and the use of force range from the traditionalist to the neorealist view. The traditionalist supports the United Nations Charter and claims that it is flexible enough to respond to the changing security environment, whereas the neorealist believes that strict interpretation of the United Nations Charter is not possible in a changing international environment. In the traditionalist view, the use of force would only be justified to protect state sovereignty from real or anticipated external intervention or for some cases of humanitarian intervention. The neorealist view differs from the traditionalist view in that the neorealist believes that there is a right to intervene unilaterally on behalf of democracy or against repression. The traditionalists disagree with this concept as they believe that every government could determine the right of intervention based on its own

definition of "democracy" or "repression."¹² These varying interpretations lead to ambiguities in international law.

As a result of ambiguities in international law, each United States administration has been able to interpret international law to support the goals and interests of the administration. This justification of their interests and goals provides support from the international environment that the United States is acting within the realm of international law. However, the multiple interpretations of international law have also highlighted the shortcomings of the United Nations. As Anthony Arend and Robert Beck have pointed out, "the United Nations has been largely unable to use effectively what theoretical power it does possess."¹³ Despite the inefficiencies of the United Nations and the controversies surrounding international law, the United States nevertheless remains an active participant in United Nations activities. The United States has a responsibility as the leading superpower to participate in international operations. In addition, participation in the United Nations is essential for support and approval from the international environment. However, even when United States troops participate in a United Nations mission, the troops still remain under the command of the President of the United States. Therefore, the guidelines presented in this study are relevant for both United Nations and United States actions involving the use of military force.

Chapter II:

Past Criteria for the Use of Military Force

Criteria for the use of military force during the Cold War followed a consistent political strategy that revolved around the central threat of communism embodied by the Soviet Union.¹⁴ However, the Vietnam War had a major effect on the use of military force in the post Cold War era. The military intervention in Vietnam failed despite a military commitment lasting longer than a decade at a cost of \$190 billion and over 58,000 American lives.¹⁵ The failures associated with the Vietnam War forced American policy makers to carefully evaluate and assess the use of military force. The "Vietnam factor" makes it difficult for the United States to commit to the use of force and to send American soldiers into combat. If the United States is going to commit to the use of force, then the American people want it done quickly and with the least amount of casualties possible. The collapse of United States policy in Vietnam raised fundamental questions about the future role of military forces in support of American foreign policy and the process by which policy makers decide to resort to force.¹⁶

After the Vietnam war, both the military and political communities recognized the need to justify the use of military force and to provide guidelines for use in the decision making process. Although some of the suggested criteria differed depending on a military or political background, many of the guidelines still emphasized several of the same considerations for the use of military force. In November 1984, then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, documented the first influential guidelines for the use of force in the Cold War and post Vietnam era. The basis for these guidelines came from the Vietnam War with the knowledge that there were "limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom."¹⁷ Weinberger also based his criteria on

past experience in Grenada in 1983 and in Lebanon from 1982-1984. Weinberger developed six major tests to apply when the United States was considering the use of military force:¹⁸

- (1) The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
- (2) If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.
- (3) If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
- (4) The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
- (5) Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
- (6) The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

Weinberger phrased his criteria negatively to send a note of caution about the use of military force. As Weinberger stated, "When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is morally required."¹⁹

After the Cold War ended, there were a number of attempts to provide guidelines and justification for the use of military force. In an environment where there was no longer a common universal threat, both the military and political communities recognized the need to justify the use of military force. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, contributed six criteria concerning the use of military force. Experience in conflicts such as the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991, and Somalia, 1992, forced Powell to design guidelines that would link military objectives to political objectives. According to Powell, the United States Government must answer these six questions before they could make the decision to use military force:²⁰

- (1) Is the political objective we seek to achieve, important, clearly defined, and understood?
- (2) Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?
- (3) Will military force achieve the objective?
- (4) At what cost?
- (5) Have the gains and risks been analyzed?
- (6) How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?

Powell firmly believed that the military must receive clear and unambiguous objectives based on clearly defined political objectives and acceptable levels of risk. Furthermore, he stressed that the United States should not only use military force when it would result in a swift and resounding victory, but also in cases where "it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue."²¹

In 1992, before becoming Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Les Aspin, summarized his observations of Powell's criteria and the military's belief on when it was appropriate to use force:²²

- (1) Force should only be used as a last resort.
- (2) Military force should only be used when there is a clear-cut military objective.
- (3) Military forces should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved.
- (4) Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion.

Aspin claimed that Powell based these criteria on past successful operations, and Aspin argued that while these operations met the criteria, the changing security environment required new guidelines. Furthermore, he stated that the basis for these criteria was an "all or nothing approach" with the idea that "if you aren't willing to put the pedal to the floor, don't start the engine."²³ Aspin, however, believed that there were other circumstances where force would be appropriate: limited force for limited purposes. In his view, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of precision guided weapons paved the way for limited uses of military force for political purposes.²⁴ The demise of the Soviet Union provided an opportunity for the United States to look

beyond the threat of nuclear war and to establish new technologies for use in conflicts that would not escalate to a superpower confrontation.

Former President George Bush also defined his perspective on the use of military force at his address to the United States Military Academy on 5 January 1993. Bush based his judgments on the constantly changing security environment with new and increasing threats. Despite Bush's disinterest in predetermined rules, he declared that there were five guidelines that could assist in shaping the military forces and in helping to reach the decision to use force:²⁵

- (1) Where the stakes warrant it
- (2) Where and when force can be effective
- (3) Where no other policies are likely to prove effective
- (4) Where its application can be limited in scope and time
- (5) Where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice

Bush claimed that these elements were essential to ensuring that the United States could justify the sacrifice involved in using force to all those affected by the decision, the American public, the military troops, and the international community.

The Clinton Administration has also contributed to the continuing debate regarding the use of military force. On 3 May 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25, PDD 25, which highlighted eight criteria for the United States to consider when deciding to support peace operations, six further restrictions when American troops would be involved, and an additional three restrictions if combat was a likely possibility.²⁶ PDD 25 came as a result of much controversy surrounding the use of United States forces in ill-planned United Nations operations. PDD 25, however, did not address military operations outside of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 1994, President Clinton outlined four questions to consider before committing military force in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*:²⁷

- (1) National interests will dictate the pace and extent of engagements.

(2) The United States will seek the help of allies or of relevant multilateral institutions as much as possible.

(3) Several questions will be considered before committing military force: Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?

(4) The engagement must meet reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds.

Clinton's criteria were based on a strategy of selective engagement in which the United States must carefully select the means and level of participation due to scarce resources in the new security environment.

The guidelines presented by politicians and military leaders during the Cold War and in the aftermath of the Cold War have greatly influenced the role of military force in the world today. Many of these government officials used their guidelines to justify or explain an existing or potential conflict involving the United States. Despite some of these criteria reflecting a specific conflict or interest, many of the guidelines still provide a basis for the new guidelines presented in this dissertation. Each of the guidelines presented in this chapter were analyzed for their potential effectiveness and importance in the new security environment. This analysis assisted in creating the new guidelines for the new security environment. Before introducing these new guidelines, it is critical to assess the current state of the military and how the current situation will also affect the creation of guidelines for the use of military force.

Chapter III:

Trying to do More with Less

The end of the Cold War caused a massive draw-down in military forces, but at the same time the range and number of military operations intensified. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a vast decrease in the budget and resources allocated to the armed forces, and as a result, the military had to reduce the size of its forces. However, the opening of new spheres of influence and the lifting of Cold War constraints caused the number of conflicts to increase. Following the end of the Cold War, the major powers were less likely to view a conflict in a distant country in geostatic terms and were thus less likely to intervene directly. Therefore, there was no longer a serious threat of superpower confrontation. In this new environment of increased conflicts, the United States has been forced to defend and promote its national interests with a military that has reduced its active-duty personnel by approximately 30% since 1991 and by approximately 60% since 1968.²⁸ The United States has found itself in a difficult position of trying to do more with less, and it does not appear that situation will improve in the future as there are more plans for reducing the number of troops and resources. The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review calls for a further "reduction of 60,000 active-duty personnel, along with a 55,000-person cut in the reserves and an 80,000-person drop in civilian personnel" by the year 2005.²⁹ This potential discontinuity between military means and political objectives demands a clear set of guidelines that can assess the potential effectiveness of a military operation before the government makes the decision to use military force.

Doing more with less has also affected the state of readiness of military troops. The lack of an immediate threat or danger has caused policy makers to lose sight of the need for wartime readiness.³⁰ The increase in the number of operations involving military force has stretched the military to its limits as commitments have also required

the overseas deployment of troops. This high operations tempo continues to strain the United States military and risks degrading its overall effectiveness. It is absolutely essential to the security of the United States that the military maintain its level of combat readiness and be prepared to confront threats to United States national interests. Although American troops are deployed to defend allied interests and security, they must also remain ready to protect the interests and security of the United States. To maintain combat readiness, the United States Government must prioritize missions and tasks. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, stated:

[W]e can modify our doctrine, we can modify our strategy, we can modify our structure, our equipment, our training, our leadership techniques, everything else to do these other missions, but we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces -- to fight and win the nation's wars.³¹

Despite the conflict between military and political organizations regarding the role of the armed forces, the use of military force should not be authorized if it threatens the ability to maintain combat readiness. The use of guidelines will assist in resolving this conflict between military and government officials regarding the role of the armed forces. The guidelines will provide the government with the ability to effectively analyze a conflict and determine if intervention in the conflict will prohibit the military from maintaining their primary responsibility of national defense. The United States must ensure that its military is combat ready at all times so that it is prepared for changes and surprises in the security environment.

Some of these problems associated with the military draw-down are a result of a bottom-up strategy initiated by President Clinton's Bottom Up Review in March 1993.³² The Bottom Up Review included a comprehensive review of national defense strategy, but made the critical mistake of answering questions about military force structure before answering the question of what the United States would need the

forces for. The result was a strategy in which the United States military should be able to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The resources and manpower, however, do not adequately match the strategy. The bottom-up approach made no attempt to specify goals or objectives before determining the strength of military forces. This approach has further expanded the use of military force in a stressful time of draw-downs and budget cutting in the armed forces. The current bottom-up approach puts a considerable strain on the United States military and limits the overall effectiveness of the use of military force. The National Defense Panel, ordered by Congress to present an alternative view to the future of defense, stressed the importance of a new strategy in the December 1997 report, 'Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century.' The report "recommended that the Pentagon weaken its emphasis on fighting 'two major theaters of war' and instead concentrate on preparing the United States for a future dominated by technology and threats from lesser powers with weapons of mass destruction."³³ The panel based this recommendation on the current security environment as well as the current status and structure of the United States military.

The United States military has found itself in a new security environment in which it has the responsibility of responding to a wide range of conflicts from local insurgency to global conflict. There are two extremes concerning the response to these conflicts and the use of force. On one extreme, there is the belief that the United States should never use force abroad. On the other extreme, is the belief that the United States should use military force in any conflict. Neither of these extremes offer a feasible solution in an environment where the military must do more with less. Henry Kissinger described this dilemma: "America's dominant task is to strike a balance between the twin temptations inherent in its exceptionalism: the notion that America must remedy every wrong and stabilize every dislocation, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself. . . . What is most needed are criteria for selectivity."³⁴

Guidelines for the use of military force will help the United States to deal with its responsibilities in the post Cold war era.

The United States has a responsibility as the leader of free nations to defend against the aggressive use of force. As General Colin Powell, stated

No other nation on earth has the power we possess. More important, no other nation on earth has the trusted power that we possess. We are obligated to lead. If the free world is to harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that our great victory in the Cold War has offered us, America must shoulder the responsibility of its power. The last best hope of earth has no other choice. We must lead.³⁵

The United States is obligated to lead responsibly due to the power entrusted to it by the international community. As the leading superpower, the United States cannot assume a policy of isolation. The international community expects the United States to respond to conflicts as it is often the only country capable of decisive intervention. Furthermore, an isolationist strategy would be dangerous for the United States as it would be without allies in a security environment with increasing numbers of threats. However, the wanton use of force is simply not possible with the current military draw-down. The United States does not have the resources or personnel to carry out such a policy. Furthermore, this form of intervention would also be irresponsible especially to the American troops. The American public and Congress would abhor such a policy due to the turmoil experienced during the Vietnam War. If the United States initiated this policy, it would also receive immense disapproval from the international community as it would be taking advantage of its entrusted power of responsible intervention. Therefore, there must be criteria for the use of selective military force in the new security environment.

Chapter IV:

New Criteria for the Use of Military Force

Due to the changes in military composition, many of the guidelines previously created are no longer adequate for determining whether or not to use military force in the new security environment. The changing environment of the post Cold War era demands its own criteria for intervention. This chapter defines new guidelines for the use of military force in the post Cold War era. These guidelines will reflect the new threats and the new security concerns as well as the draw-down of the United States military. These guidelines will also account for the wide range of conflicts that the United States faces in the post Cold War era, a spectrum ranging from local insurgency to global conflict. The military forces have changed immensely since the Vietnam War and even more so since the collapse of the Cold War. The criteria for the use of military force will reflect these changes and provide adequate guidelines for helping policy makers to decide whether or not to use military force.

When looking at the new guidelines presented in this chapter concerning the use of military force, it is important to recognize that these guidelines should not result in hard line rules. They are simply a set of issues that the President and members of the government can use when deciding whether or not to use military force. Every situation is unique, and strict rules would only set the United States up for failure. There must be latitude for the President of the United States and Commander in Chief to make a decision based on the uniqueness of a situation. As former President George Bush stated:

In the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment. Each and every case is unique. To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives. And it would give would-be trouble-makers a blue print for

determining their own actions. It could signal U.S. friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on.³⁶

Guidelines for the use of force should only assist in the decision making process. President Clinton further restated this principle: "It is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force, but it is appropriate to identify several basic principles that will guide our decisions on when to use force."³⁷

A statement by General Colin Powell, further explains the danger of setting strict limitations and rules for the use of military force: "There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous. First, it destroys the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy's mind regarding our intentions. Unless part of our strategy is to destroy that ambiguity, it is usually helpful to keep it intact."³⁸ The element of surprise is critical in military operations, and it has the potential to determine success or failure in an operation. Attacking an adversary unexpectedly can increase the effectiveness of a military operation as they will not be prepared to defend the attack, and the damage to the enemy can be severe. Despite General Powell's emphasis on the need for surprise, he still believed that there were certain guidelines necessary to evaluate before deciding to use military force.

When former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, stated his criteria for the use of military force, liberal and conservative parties widely criticized his criteria claiming that they were a prescription for inaction. These critics claimed that the Weinberger criteria (defined in chapter two) were unobtainable in many instances where it would be appropriate for the United States to use limited military intervention.³⁹ The criticism directed towards Weinberger further explains why guidelines should only assist in the decision making process.

Guidelines for the use of military force can be helpful in the decision making process, but they can also serve as a check and balance with other members of government. The guidelines should be utilized throughout the government so that

government members are aware of and can contribute to the decision making process. Guidelines can also serve as a means for providing moral and legal justification to the American public and international community for the use of military force. According to David Tarr, author of *The Employment of Force: Political Constraints and Limitations*, virtually all presidents and secretaries of state have associated American foreign policies with avowed moral principles that serve to rationalize and justify United States foreign policy behavior and the use of military force.⁴⁰

This new security environment dictates that United States decision makers respond to more numerous and increasingly diverse threat scenarios. Because of this increase in threats, there may be some tendency for American decision makers to move too quickly and perhaps irresponsibly from diagnosis to response. This tendency to react quickly is part of American culture that demands action rather than contemplation.⁴¹ A set of guidelines can assist in solving this problem by providing criteria to consider in the decision making process. The uncertainty and confusion over America's role in the new security environment creates an opportunity to reformulate the guidelines for the use of military force and to educate the public about the responsibilities of the United States. Furthermore, the current and future draw-down of the United States military makes the time ripe for such a re-evaluation of the use of military force.

National interests should be prioritized, but should only act as a guide

This study will focus on national interests as defined by the United States Government. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, defined national interests under three categories: vital, important, and humanitarian.⁴² Vital interests, according to Cohen are those that involve the economic well being and defense of United States territory, citizens, and allies. The United States should always be willing to protect vital national interests through the use of military force as threats against vital national

interests threaten the security of the United States. The second category of national interests is important national interests. These interests, according to Cohen, do not affect national survival or well-being, but affect the quality of life and character of the world. These interests are not necessarily national security interests, but may still require limited amounts of military force. According to Hillen, "The level of interest will depend on the gravity of the threat, the national security implications inherent in the interest, and the suitability of a military response to the threat."⁴³ Normally, military force for important national interests is used only as a last resort. The final category of national interests is what Cohen defines as humanitarian interests. According to Cohen, "the military is [generally] not the most appropriate tool to address humanitarian concerns, but under certain conditions, the use of U.S. military forces may be appropriate."⁴⁴ Normally, humanitarian interests are not national security interests and they are often better addressed through means other than military force. These categories will assist the United States Government in determining what its priorities are and where it is best suited to use military force.

National interests are an important factor when deciding to use military force, but they are not the only factor to consider. Many policy makers, including former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, believed that the United States should only commit to military force if it was essential to maintaining vital national interests. However, the new security environment demands more than simply committing force to protect vital interests of the United States. As former President George Bush stated, "Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less than vital."⁴⁵ Furthermore, it is also important to understand that not all interests require military intervention. Prioritizing national interests will assist the United States in its decision making process, and it will help to allocate resources for the use of military force accordingly.

Interests are also important to provide justification and to gain public support for an operation. According to George Osborn and William Taylor, Jr., authors of *The Employment of Force: Political-Military Considerations*, "An important part of that responsibility of justification is to demonstrate the linkage between American involvement in military conflict and the pursuit of some clear U.S. interest. The longer the conflict and the greater the expenditure of U.S. resources, the greater the justification required to pacify the almost inevitable opposition."⁴⁶ If the American public can understand the importance of the national interests at risk, then it is far more likely that they will support the intervention. The opposite is also true. If there are not well perceived national interests, then the American public is less likely to be tolerant of an operation where the use of military force will result in casualties. In the Vietnam War, Americans demanded the withdrawal of troops as a result of increased costs and casualties without explicitly stated national interests. "It was not the casualties that turned people against the Vietnam War and everybody associated with it. It was that neither civilian nor military leaders could explain why Vietnam was worth dying for."⁴⁷

It is also important to recognize the controversy surrounding national interests. Because of the difficulty involved in defining national interests, they should only serve as a guide for the use of military force. National interests may change from one administration to another and they may also be changed to fit the circumstances of a specific conflict. The government recognizes the importance of national interests and can therefore use them to justify a specific intervention. Thus, the national interest becomes more of a "catch phrase" than a proper justification. However, if national interests are prioritized and made public knowledge, then this superficial justification can possibly be prevented.

The United States must set clear and identifiable political and military objectives, military objectives must be clearly linked to political objectives

This need for clearly defined objectives goes back to Clausewitz's point that "No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve and how he intends to conduct it."⁴⁸ This requirement for clearly defined objectives resurfaced during the Vietnam War when the United States faced the consequences of military intervention without clear and identifiable political objectives. The United States also recognized that it was necessary for objectives to contribute directly to the overall goals. In Vietnam, "the costly battlefield victories won by American forces often had little or no ultimate effect on the strategic or political outcome of the war."⁴⁹ When winning battlefield victories did not produce positive results, the American public came to believe that soldiers were dying in vain because there was no explanation of how success could be achieved.

The Vietnam War also emphasized the potential danger of changing political objectives once an intervention had already begun. If the United States finds it necessary to change objectives, then changing objectives during a conflict should receive the same amount of scrutiny as the original decision to use military force.⁵⁰ If there are unclear political objectives, then the achievement of military objectives may not result in the desired political outcome. There may also be a high potential for failure. During the Vietnam War, there was a disparity between political goals and military objectives. As a result, the political leaders did not provide the military with the resources it needed to carry out the operation. It is essential that military objectives are clearly linked to the overall political objectives. For military objectives to contribute to the political goals of an operation, they must be clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.⁵¹

The military must be given the opportunity to succeed

If the United States commits to the use of force, then it must also be willing to allow the military the opportunity to succeed. The military must have the necessary resources available to complete an operation. To ensure that this occurs, the United States must continually reassess and adjust the amount of forces and resources allocated for an operation as it is possible that circumstances can change during an operation. Experience in Vietnam has shown that the military does not want to be forced into a situation where it does not have the opportunity to achieve success. The article *Military Culture and Institutional Change* by A. J. Bacevich describes this viewpoint: "when it comes to being engaged in any undertaking where political objectives are hazy, public support only tepid, the prospects for a rapid decision remote, and the risk of substantial casualties high, service opinion is unanimous: count us out."⁵² Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger also contributed his thoughts to this requirement: "If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all."⁵³ Furthermore, if the United States commits to an operation without the required resources and fails, then United States political standing in the international community will be lowered. In addition, there will be a loss of trust in the United States ability to carry out a successful military operation in the international environment.

The United States Government should also allow the military the autonomy to take action and make decisions in a military operation. The government should provide the military with the political objectives of the operation and general rules to follow, but the military should be allowed the autonomy to carry out the specifics of the operation. For this to occur, there must be a degree of trust between the military and political communities. This trusted autonomy will ensure that the United States minimizes the costs and risks involved. However, political and military leaders must still work together to continually reassess the mission objectives and accomplishments.

Cooperation between military and political leaders can only enhance the overall effectiveness of an operation by creating an environment of trust and effective communication.

The use of military force should do more good than harm

It is important to point out that there are two sides of foreign policy at any moment, the pragmatic side and the ethical side. Neither side should be disregarded. Under the just war theory, the causes of intervention must be just, the use of military force must be just, and the result of military force should be more beneficial than the damage caused in intervention.⁵⁴ To meet these requirements, the United States must thoroughly assess a conflict before it intervenes to ensure that there is a reasonable chance of success and that the damage caused in intervening will be less than the damage of non-intervention. As General Colin Powell stated, "the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue."⁵⁵ Before making the decision to intervene, the United States must assess whether its actions will improve the security of the situation both in the short and long term. This assessment is important to determine the effects of intervention on the community involved as well as United States international standing after intervention. If the use of military force does more good than harm, then the United States is more likely to face a favorable assessment from the international community.

If the United States commits to using military force, then it should do so wholeheartedly. This commitment will help to ensure that the United States is doing more good than harm in an operation. Barry Blechman, author of *Force Without War*, has written that "it is evident from the aggregate analyses that the firmer the commitment implied by the military operation, the more often the outcome of the situation was favorable to the United States."⁵⁶ If the United States is to

wholeheartedly commit to an operation, then it must analyze worst case scenarios and also prepare to complete the operation under those scenarios. As Graham Allison pointed out, this requirement was a lesson learned from the Vietnam War: "No one familiar with the development of U.S. choices in Viet Nam can underestimate the importance of more systematic analysis of proposed uses of American forces, more careful projection of enemy reactions, and an attempt to consider the consequences if less than favorable projections turn out to be right."⁵⁷ To effectively prepare for all circumstances, the United States must anticipate its adversary's responses. It is absolutely essential to research the adversary's strengths and weaknesses and to assess United States capabilities before committing to an operation. Although this task may be time consuming, it is critical to gain this knowledge before making the decision to commit to military force. Furthermore, it is essential to discuss what will happen if the objectives become unobtainable. Once committed to an operation, it may not always be possible to achieve success, and this possibility must be assessed. Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, testified his outlook regarding this possibility before Congress :

You want some sense that they have thought about the plausible failure modes of their military strategy and have thought through a little bit about what they are going to do if those failure modes occur. How are they going to get out if they cannot achieve their objectives at the costs and risks that they have put on the table? . . . What are you going to do if things do not go as planned?⁵⁸

Although the United States does not like to consider failure, it is a possibility and it must be considered in the decision making process.

Success should be based on achieving objectives not on achieving an exit date

Setting an exit date without ensuring that objectives have been achieved is extremely risky and dangerous. Withdrawal before meeting objectives could result in a

sense of failure and abandonment of purpose. This can contribute to poor morale in the military and among the American public. In addition, there may be political ramifications from the international community if the United States does not make every effort to accomplish the objectives of the operation, especially if the international community is counting on the American military for a successful mission. If an operation is important enough for the United States to commit to the use of military force, then it should be important enough to accomplish the objectives and complete the mission. According to Hillen, "Time-driven interventions are the de facto strategy of this administration because it cannot find achievable and sustainable military goals in its ill-defined and ambiguous interventions."⁵⁹ Hillen's remark came after President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, commented that "sharp withdrawal deadlines" were critical factors for achieving success in an operation.⁶⁰ The extension of the Bosnian mission by President Clinton later displayed the fallacy of Lake's statements. As witnessed in Bosnia, the United States did not meet the deadline for the withdrawal of troops because the objectives had not been achieved. As a result, Clinton withdrew the exit date and attempted to set objectives to achieve before the total withdrawal of American soldiers.

Choosing an exit date simply guarantees that American troops will be present in a conflict for a given amount of time, but it will not necessarily guarantee that they will accomplish what they were sent there to achieve. The focus of military strategy should be on objectives, not on an exit date. According to Hillen, "Good strategy provides an exit because its military and political objectives are linked toward a common purpose and pursued by military forces more than capable of achieving these objectives."⁶¹ The United States should certainly assess how long an operation is likely to endure to ensure that it has the required resources. However, it is important to understand that an operation may be lengthened for unforeseen circumstances.

Committing to an operation means committing to objectives, not committing to a duration of time.

Congressional and public support is ideal, but not required

The Vietnam War displayed the serious problems that could result from a lack of support from Congress and from the American public. Although the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 10 August 1964 endorsed intervention in Vietnam and received only two dissenting votes in Congress, enthusiasm for the intervention faded quickly after the devastation of the Tet offensive in 1968.⁶² Because Congress had already approved the operation, it was extremely difficult for congressional members to have a substantial influence on the immediate withdrawal of troops once support for the operation decreased. Congressional and public support for the war in Vietnam declined due to poorly defined objectives in an operation that was causing more harm than good. The agonizing defeats in Vietnam and the high number of casualties shattered the United States domestic consensus of using military force to defeat communism. In the view of the American public, the threat of communism no longer justified the immediate use of force, and the United States would have to meet critical factors before committing American soldiers to combat. Earl Ravenal, author of *The Case for Strategic Disengagement*, further explained how the employment of force, especially in long duration, requires public support:

The condition that will complicate the enforcement of international order is the lack of consensus in domestic support not when our system is free from external pressure, but precisely when it most needs steady support. Few societies -- especially one such as the United States -- will hold together in foreign exercises that are ill-defined or, conversely, dedicated to the maintenance of a balance of power. . . . The lack of public support might not prevent intervention, but it might critically inhibit its prosecution.⁶³

Therefore, the President should make every effort to rally the American public to gain support for the American troops. The President can not achieve this support unless

the threats and objectives are clear. Support from Congress and the American public increases the morale of the troops and ultimately increases the overall effectiveness of an operation. Furthermore, the American public will be much more likely to tolerate casualties when they understand the goals and risks associated with military force.

The War Powers Resolution adopted on 7 November 1973 aimed to reduce the problems associated with the Vietnam War by restricting the extended deployment of United States troops abroad without congressional approval. Under the War Powers Act, the President can commit United States forces to combat for up to sixty days, and the forces can only remain past the initial sixty days if Congress votes to extend the operation. Section three of this Act also states that:

The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress.⁶⁴

Congress hoped that this requirement would strengthen its oversight capabilities by requiring that proposed interventions be submitted to reasoned debate apart from the limited circle of the president and his immediate staff.⁶⁵

Although it is ideal to have the support of Congress, it may not always be feasible. Under certain circumstances it may not be possible for United States key officials to explain an operation before it occurs. The element of surprise is extremely important in combat, and notifying Congress could potentially put soldiers in harms way. There may also be times when the President must act with secrecy and expediency due to critical emergencies or threats to national security. Under these circumstances, it is often not be feasible to gain congressional approval before committing to the use of force.

If possible, however, the President should make every effort to fully explain an operation and consult with Congress before committing to a decision. Due to the

constitutional role that Congress plays in the decision making process concerning the use of military force and the declaration of war, the President should make every effort to involve Congress. However, it may not always be possible for the President to achieve a formal commitment from Congress due to the lengthy process associated with congressional decisions. Under these circumstances, the President must recognize the dangers involved if Congress does not support the operation. The War Powers Act requires that Congress continue to approve the operation if its duration is longer than envisaged. If Congress does not approve the operation, then it is possible for Congress to withdraw funding for the operation and demand the immediate withdrawal of American troops. Thus, the President should make every effort to consult with Congress and gain congressional approval for an operation, especially when secrecy and expediency are not a factor. Cooperation between the legislative and executive branches can only increase the overall effectiveness of an operation.

Committing to the use of force should not extend the military beyond its limits of effectiveness

The current national security strategy requires the United States armed forces to be able to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC). The MRC concept is based on conflicts involving clearly defined objectives, limited duration, and high technology weapons. However, increased military interventions in the post Cold War era have made it impossible to honor the current national security strategy. Former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogleman, testified before the House National Security Committee that the service chiefs "had made no secret of the fact that we have never had the force structure that was called for . . . to execute the two-MRC strategy."⁶⁶ However, the military must attempt to structure itself based on the two war plan until the administration revises this strategy.

As explained in chapter two, the military has also experienced an immense draw-down since the end of the Cold War. The United States must ensure that it keeps its goals within its limits and that it does not make commitments without the resources required to achieve them. When deciding to use military force, the United States must ensure that it does not stretch the military beyond its effective limits. Policy makers must understand that the use of military force in one operation may jeopardize the military's ability to meet a more important security commitment or its ability to maintain its war fighting readiness. The United States should only use military resources when they are essential and when they will be effective.

To assist with increasing commitments, the United States should also look to its allies for assistance. In the post Cold War environment, both the United States and its allies recognize the need to share the burdens associated with alliances. Although burden sharing is important, multilateral action should not be a requirement for intervention. If a conflict is important enough for the United States to commit the use of military force, then it is also important enough for it to act unilaterally to achieve the objectives. However, if the United States decides to act unilaterally, then it must also assess the political ramifications from the international community.

The level and type of force used will vary depending upon the conflict

One aspect of the use of force is whether or not the United States should use force only as a last resort as suggested in Weinberger's criteria. The basis for this study is that military force should not be placed at the end of a spectrum of responses to conflict. Although it is wise to evaluate available options before using force, it is important to recognize that force may not always be the last resort, it may be the best resort. If military force is the last resort, then what can the United States do if the last resort fails? Each situation will be different and the United States has the responsibility to assess each situation and decide the best response.

The just war theory of using force as a last resort also puts pressure on the United States to use force only after every other option has failed. However, this can result in possible failure or higher costs for the United States. As Richard Haass has written:

This desire to postpone armed conflict is understandable; nonetheless, it can be ill-advised. Waiting until other policies have failed may limit or forfeit the opportunity to use force effectively. The passage of time may mean the loss of surprise and the loss of initiative while giving the adversary opportunity to prepare militarily and politically for the battle to come.⁶⁷

There is no way to comprehend what every future conflict will entail, and the United States should evaluate multiple responses. Analyzing potential alternatives before using military force is a moral responsibility, but it does not necessarily require the United States to use force only as a last resort. It is important that policy makers do not turn to force too "frequently or quickly to secure political objectives abroad; it should be used only in very special circumstances."⁶⁸

Once the decision has been made that force is necessary, the United States must assess how much and what type of force is adequate for use in the conflict. Some politicians and military leaders, such as General Powell, believed that the United States should use force in an overwhelming fashion. Others, such as former Secretary of Defense Aspin, believed that force should be limited. Aspin's support for limited force was based on the development and availability of precision guided weapons. However, it is important to evaluate whether these weapons alone can achieve all of the political and military objectives. There are limits to what technology can accomplish. It is possible for the military to actually undermine its ability and effectiveness by an over-reliance on high technology. It is important to acknowledge that the enemy could have the potential to assess the weaknesses associated with high technology, and to take advantage of those weaknesses when formulating military strategy. Every situation is unique and the amount or type of force can not be

prescribed until the United States has completed a full analysis of the conflict and the capabilities required to achieve the objectives. To protect the military and to ensure minimal risks, it is preferable to use too much force rather than not enough force. There are a lot of unknown factors that may occur on the battlefield and it is best to have an overwhelming amount of resources available to defeat potential threats and to prevent undue loss of life by American soldiers.

If the United States is faced with the decision to use military force, then the guidelines presented in this chapter will assist in the decision making process. Although these guidelines cannot guarantee success in an operation, they can provide a thorough analysis of the conflict and potential ramifications of military intervention. These guidelines regard the use of force as an action to be taken under specific circumstances. If the United States does not meet these criteria, then it may be best to assess the feasibility of options other than military force. The following chapter presents case studies of military intervention in support of the guidelines and provides evidence of their effectiveness in analyzing the use of military force.

Chapter V:

Case Studies

This chapter examines four incidents of United States military intervention from a military perspective. These case studies are used to provide evidence for the guidelines developed in this study. The case studies include two events from the Cold War era, Lebanon and Panama, and two events from the post Cold War era, the Gulf War and Somalia. This study first examines the operations and then assesses why these operations were a success or failure. The analysis of previous conflicts involving United States military intervention provides evidence and support for the guidelines presented in this dissertation.

Lebanon

On 14 September 1982, two critical events occurred in Lebanon, the first was the successful departure of the Multi-National Force (MNF) and the second was the assassination of the President Elect of Lebanon.⁶⁹ The MNF, made up of Italian, French, and American troops, was invited to Lebanon to assist in withdrawing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut. This request to aid the PLO withdrawal came as a result of the PLO's failure to repel an invasion from Israel. The MNF hoped that by facilitating the withdrawal of the PLO, they could move towards peace within the region. By September, the MNF had successfully achieved its objectives and agreed that the time had come to depart. Shortly after the MNF departed, the President Elect of Lebanon was assassinated and the Israeli Army moved into Beirut where they massacred approximately 700 unarmed Palestinian refugees who were promised safety in refugee camps.

As a result of this massacre, then President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, received pressure to deploy another MNF to force the withdrawal of Israelis

and Syrians from Lebanon. Despite opposition from military leaders, including the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1,200 Marines deployed to Beirut along with 4,000 troops from Italy, France, and the United Kingdom.⁷⁰ The troops did not have a specific or defined mission, but the vague direction was to establish a presence within Lebanon. Both the State Department and the National Security Council wanted American troops in Lebanon because they believed that the presence of American troops would be adequate to encourage a diplomatic solution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed the mission arguing that "without a clearly defined objective, it would be extremely difficult to determine the proper size and armament rules of engagement for the force."⁷¹ Due to the vague mission objectives, the MNF was lightly armed. If the conflict escalated, the MNF would be unable to defend itself as it did not have an adequate number of personnel or weapons to deal with any major military escalation that could occur. This lack of a clearly defined objective as well as limited weaponry and manpower put the military in a situation where it did not have the opportunity for success. When the violence increased, instead of defending themselves, the United States Marines were moved to a reinforced concrete building. Under the terms of the MNF agreement, the Marines were not equipped nor authorized to take the normal responsive actions to protect themselves in combat. On 23 October 1983, suicide terrorists blew up the building that housed the Marines and killed 241 American servicemen. The operation in Lebanon was a failure, lives were lost carelessly and the objectives were not achieved.

The operation in Lebanon failed due to poorly defined political objectives that were not linked to the military objectives. Simply establishing a military presence could not achieve the overall political objectives. Due to constraints of the MNF agreement, the military was placed in an impossible situation where they had no chance of success. They did not have the resources nor the authorization to force the withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian armies. The failure of military and political

leaders to work together further contributed to the overall failure of the operation. The United States misread the complexity of the situation when it deployed the second MNF, and as a result, lives were lost. Overall, United States military intervention in Lebanon was a failure: there were no clear political or military objectives, military objectives were not linked to political objectives, the military did not have the opportunity for success, and the use of force did more harm than good as the security in the region deteriorated after the intervention. Furthermore, the failed intervention caused Americans to take a firm stance on the non-use of military force where there were no inherent American interests or where the risks outweighed the potential benefits.

Panama

On 19 December 1989, the United States launched Operation Just Cause to neutralize the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and to arrest its leader, Manuel Noriega.⁷² The United States justified its mission based on a number of critical incidents leading up to the use of military force. Noriega was not only involved with drug trafficking, but he was also seen as a threat to Panamanian democracy after he nullified the results of the May 1989 election and denied victory to opposition candidates. After an unsuccessful coup attempt in October 1989, Noriega's responses to United States pressures became more unpredictable, and the situation in Panama became increasingly dangerous. Finally in December, Panama declared that it was in a state of war against the United States. This declaration of war gave the United States all the justification it needed to use military force against the PDF. The United States had 10,000 military personnel stationed in Panama who were being threatened and harassed by the PDF, and the United States had the responsibility to ensure their safety. The safety of over 50,000 Americans in Panama constituted a vital interest for the United States, and it had no other reasonable option but to use military force. The

potential threat to American lives further justified a unilateral United States intervention.

National interests helped to justify the use for military force and also provided clear and identifiable military objectives. According to then President George Bush, United States objectives were "to protect United States personnel, restore democracy in Panama by installing the Endera government, to apprehend Noriega and destroy the power of the PDF, and to protect the [Panama] Canal."⁷³ The military objectives were successfully linked to the political objectives, and the United States forces completed the operation within two months. As for long term success, the restoration of democracy is questionable as Panama is less than a model democracy. However, the operation in Panama was still deemed a success. The military mission was successful primarily due to the military being given the autonomy and resources to complete the mission. According to retired Army Lieutenant General Edward Flanagan, "The commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces, the president of the United States, gave his military forces a job to do and then let them do it without second-guessing or 'tying one hand behind their backs.'"⁷⁴

The United States went into the military operation wholeheartedly and provided the military with all the resources they needed to succeed. President Bush authorized an overwhelming display of military force involving over 25,000 forces and a large number of aircraft. The United States military had the advantage of surprise as Noriega did not expect nor prepare for the invasion. This factor of surprise was largely a result of secrecy concerning the operation in that congressional leaders were informed about the decision to use military force after the decision had been made and hours before the operation began. Due to the dangers and security concerns surrounding previous events in Panama, Bush already had informal congressional and public support. The level of international support still remains questionable as the legality of the operation under international law is debatable depending upon which

interpretation of international law is taken. However, Bush further instilled support and justification for the operation by stressing the importance of national interests and clear objectives in the operation. Another reason for success was that there was no promise for withdrawal or victory by a certain date. President Bush allowed for flexible dates for achieving the objectives of the operation. According to General Edward Meyer, Army Chief of Staff from 1979 to 1983, Operation Just Cause "was probably the best-conceived military operation since World War II."⁷⁵

Despite the success of Operation Just Cause, the use of military force did not solve many of the problems in Panama, specifically the problem of drug trafficking and the lack of democracy. The use of force would also have to be accompanied by nation building skills for a more permanent resolution.⁷⁶ However, it is possible that the situation in Panama would be much worse, specifically for the people of Panama and the Americans stationed there, if the United States military intervention had not occurred.

The Gulf War

Many Americans and scholars have declared the Gulf War as a "defining moment in military history" and an overwhelming success for the United States.⁷⁷ On 8 August 1990, then President George Bush made the decision to deploy military forces to Saudi Arabia. This action came as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August and Iraq's build up for potential invasion into Saudi Arabia. This operation, known as Desert Shield, was intended to deter an Iraqi invasion into Saudi Arabia. In addition, the use of economic and political sanctions were intended to influence the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein refused to comply with the requests, and on 17 January 1991, the United States and its coalition partners launched Operation Desert Storm. The objective of Desert Storm was to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait to prevent any further Iraqi aggression. Former President George Bush

worked extremely hard to gain the support that he needed to ensure that the Gulf War could be successful. As explained in *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, President Bush used his leadership to the fullest extent possible:

Throughout the Gulf crisis the president was able to lead, mobilize, and shape public opinion to support his actions; at every turn he was able to garner international support and then turn and use it to mobilize approval from Congress and from the general public. President Bush's handling of the crisis was an exercise in good, old-fashioned leadership.⁷⁸

As a result of Bush's leadership, Operation Desert Storm received an immense amount of support from the international community as well as from Congress and the American public. International support came with the United Nations Security Council Resolution to use all means necessary to liberate Kuwait. Support from Congress followed with the congressional approval of the Security Council resolution. There was also wide spread support from the American public. The operation received its final support and justification after Secretary of State James Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on 8 January 1991. This last chance for diplomacy failed as it was made clear that Iraq had no intention of withdrawing its forces from Kuwait. At this point, force was believed to be the only effective option.

President Bush sustained support for Operation Desert Storm throughout the entire operation by ensuring that the American public was well aware of the threats to national interests and by reinforcing the clear and identifiable objectives of the operation. After the war, many critics complained that the United States should have gone all the way to Baghdad to finish the job. However, this was not an objective of the operation, and it did not have the support of the American public, Congress, nor the international community. This new objective would have stretched the military beyond its limits of effectiveness and the potential for increased costs and casualties would have been extremely high. The Bush Administration made the right decision of defending the original objectives of the operation as any deviation from the original

objectives could have resulted in failure. The original objectives were straight forward, and the military was given all of the resources and manpower that they needed to complete the mission. In addition, there was no date set for completion of the objectives, and the coalition maintained a flexible timetable to achieve its objectives. All of these factors led to a successful military intervention.

The United States led coalition achieved the objectives of Operation Desert Storm in less than two months. The coalition was successful in a short amount of time with a small amount of casualties due to the overwhelming use of force. This use of quick and decisive force was primarily a result of the American commanders involved in the operation. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of Operation Desert Storm, and General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had both commanded units in the Vietnam War. Their memories of the Vietnam War affected their thinking about the use of military force, and "they gave little thought to limited attacks or deliberate increases in escalation. Massive military force would be used in the hope that Iraq could be defeated quickly and with low allied casualties."⁷⁹ Although this use of force was extremely successful in Operation Desert Storm, it is relevant to assess whether or not the use of military force was actually successful in changing the political environment. The United States and its coalition partners achieved the objective of liberating Kuwait, but Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army is still a threat in the current environment. In analyzing the current situation in which Iraq remains a major threat to international security with weapons of mass destruction, the United States must question if there was more that it could have done in the previous conflict to prevent the new predicament. This dissertation will not specifically address these questions due to the length of the discussion involved, but they must be assessed by military and political leaders if the United States is to make progress and achieve success in future conflicts.

Somalia

In December 1992, then President George Bush ordered a military intervention in Somalia.⁸⁰ This operation, known as Operation Restore Hope, involved over 30,000 troops, including troops from France, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and many other nations. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by the United States was sent to Somalia to stabilize the military situation in Somalia to avert mass starvation. Once UNITAF accomplished that mission, they were to transfer the operation to the United Nations. The mass starvation in Somalia was not viewed as a vital or important national interest for the United States, but it was viewed as a humanitarian crisis by the international community. The United States was the only nation that could provide all of the resources in a short amount of time. President Bush viewed the operation as a swift and relatively low risk means of assisting in the international environment. Furthermore, the international community and the American public believed that the United States had a moral responsibility to provide aid in Somalia. The United States had supplied many of the weapons to Somalia during the Cold War that later caused much of the civil war and economic disaster. As a result of the mass starvation in Somalia, the United Nations authorized UNITAF to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."⁸¹

UNITAF succeeded in securing an environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and relief supplies, and as a result, the death rates decreased in Somalia. If the operation had ceased at that time, as originally intended, then the United States involvement in Somalia may have been viewed as a success. However, the United Nations take over took longer than expected, and incoming United States President Bill Clinton changed the objectives of United States involvement in Somalia. Due to increased violence in Somalia, the Clinton Administration believed that a larger American contingent was needed in Somalia. There was little consultation with

Congress regarding this change in objectives, and there was also minor media coverage. American casualties increased when American forces became involved with the capture of Somali clan leader, General Aideed. As a result of increased casualties, Congress began to call for the withdrawal of America troops. The final factor contributing to congressional disapproval and growing dissent of the American people occurred on 3 October 1993 during a battle in Mogadishu. During that battle, 19 Americans were killed and seventy-five were injured, and the body of a fallen American soldier was dragged through the streets by jubilant Somalis.⁸² Somalia had quickly become a terrible failure for the United States.

Perhaps the primary lesson to take from Somalia is the danger involved in changing objectives mid-phase of an operation, especially when the objectives are ill-defined and unsupported. The original objectives defined by President Bush had clear and identifiable goals with low levels of risk involved. The new objectives defined by the Clinton Administration were not linked to the military objectives as the troops in Somalia lacked the resources and training required for the change in objectives to be successful. President Clinton proposed a concept of nation building that could not be achieved in that security environment under the military force structure. The American troops, although initially successful in Somalia, were ordered into an environment that would not provide them with the opportunity for success, and their lives were put at risk for unclear objectives. The United States can only classify Somalia as a disaster for the use of American military force.

Conclusion

The role of the United States has evolved dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The security environment has changed and the threats that were prevalent during the Cold War are no longer major influences in the world today. However, the post Cold War environment has presented its own threats and problems to international security. As a result, the United States has had to evaluate its new role in the international environment and determine when it is appropriate and necessary to authorize the use of military force.

This dissertation assessed the post Cold War environment and recommended guidelines for the authorization of military force. Chapter one examined the international environment and the role of international law in intervention. Chapter two analyzed past criteria for intervention and examined how political and military leaders viewed the requirements for military force. Chapter three assessed the current situation in the armed forces where the military is forced to do more with less. Together, these chapters affirmed the need for new guidelines in the post Cold War security environment. These guidelines, presented in chapter four, provide criteria for the authorization of military force:

- (1) National interests should be prioritized, but should only act as a guide.
- (2) The United States must set clear and identifiable political and military objectives, military objectives must be clearly linked to political objectives.
- (3) The military must be given the opportunity to succeed.
- (4) The use of military force should do more good than harm.
- (5) Success should be based on achieving objectives, not on achieving an exit date.
- (6) Congressional and public support is ideal, but not required.
- (7) Committing to the use of force should not extend the military beyond its limits of effectiveness.
- (8) The level and type of force used will vary depending upon the conflict.

In chapter five, case studies further legitimized the new guidelines.

This dissertation demonstrated why the guidelines presented in this dissertation are essential elements in determining whether or not to authorize military force. Furthermore, the analysis of the new security environment affirmed the need for new criteria in the post Cold War era. If the United States uses the new guidelines, then it will have a greater opportunity for successful military intervention.

Notes

Introduction

¹Author of 'New Instabilities, New Priorities', quoted in Haass, *Intervention*, p. 8.

²Kanter and Brooks, eds., *Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World*, p. 1.

³Quoted in Haass, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴Handel, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, p. 118.

⁵Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 230.

⁶Hillen, 'Chapter 15: Planning a Coherent Military Strategy', *Mandate for Leadership IV*, p. 4.

Chapter I

⁷Art and Waltz, *The Use of Force*, p. 4.

⁸Arend and Beck, *International Law and the Use of Force*, p. 3.

⁹Author of *No Common Power*, quoted in Arend and Beck, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰Henkin et. al., *Right V. Might*, p. 3.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

¹²*Ibid.* p. 7.

¹³See Arend and Beck, op. cit., p. 4.

Chapter II

¹⁴According to a study undertaken by scholars Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, there were eight factors that would lead to successful military intervention during the Cold War: (1) The strength of the United States motivation, (2) An asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States, (3) The clarity of United States objectives, (4) A sense of urgency to achieve the United States objectives, (5) Adequate domestic political support, (6) Usable military options, (7) Opponents' fear of unacceptable escalation, (8) Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement. These guidelines were based on previous United States military intervention in Laos, Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although these guidelines were created for the Cold War period, there still remains some congruence with the post Cold War criteria. See Stern, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁵Connaughton, *Military Intervention in the 1990s*, p. 29. and Schraeder, ed., *Intervention in the 1980s*, p. 142.

¹⁶Stern, ed., *The Limits of Military Intervention*, p. 345.

¹⁷See Weinberger, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Powell, 'U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead', *Foreign Affairs*, p. 38.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 40.

²²Excerpts from an address by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee to the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1992, reprinted in Haass, op. cit., pp. 184-185.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 185.

²⁴See Haass, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁵Address by President George Bush delivered at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, January 5, 1993, reprinted in Haass, op. cit., p. 203.

²⁶Daniel, 'U.S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in Context', *Strategic Research Department Research Memorandum 3-94*, p. 1.

²⁷Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, pp. 39-41.

Chapter III

²⁸Wilson, 'Two-War Plan is Unrealistic, Hollow', *Air Force Times*, p. 54.

²⁹Maze, 'Lawmakers Oppose Cutting an Overworked Force', *Air Force Times*, p. 12.

³⁰Hillen, 'Chapter 12: Defining the Proper U.S. Role in Global Security', *Mandate for Leadership IV*, p. 7.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²*Ibid.*, p. 3.

³³Elrich, 'Ill-defined Visions of Threats are Criticized', *Air Force Times*, and Weible, 'Deferred Decisions Raise Questions', *Air Force Times*, p. 28.

³⁴See Hillen, 'American Military Intervention', *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁵See Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Chapter IV

³⁶See Bush in Haass, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

³⁷See Clinton, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³⁸See Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

³⁹See Hillen, 'American Military Intervention', *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁰Sarkesian and Scully, eds., *U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict*, p. 56.

⁴¹See Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁴²Cohen, 'U.S. Military Readiness for an Uncertain Future', *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, p. 3.

⁴³See Hillen, 'Chapter 12', *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁴See Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴⁵See Bush in Haass, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁴⁶See Sarkesian and Scully, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁴⁷Wilson, 'When to Bomb Iraq and When Not to', *Air Force Times*, p. 62.

⁴⁸Quoted in Weinberger, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴⁹See Hillen, 'Chapter 12', *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁵⁰See Haass, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁵¹See Hillen, 'American Military Intervention', *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵²Quoted in Hillen, 'American Military Intervention', *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵³See Weinberger, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵⁴Coates, *The Ethics of War*, p. 97.

⁵⁵See Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁵⁶Blechman, et. al., *Force Without War*, p. 529.

⁵⁷See Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 253-254.

⁵⁸United States Congress, Committee on Armed Services, *The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 29.

⁵⁹See Hillen, 'American Military Intervention', *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹See Hillen, 'Chapter 12', *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶²Collins, 'Military Intervention', *Parameters*, p. 4.

⁶³See Sarkesian and Scully, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶⁴War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, Passed by the 93rd Congress, Joint Resolution 542, reprinted in Haass, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁶⁵See Schraeder, *op. cit.*, p. 36 and 284.

⁶⁶See Hillen, 'American Military Intervention', *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁶⁷See Haass, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁶⁸See Blechman, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

Chapter V

⁶⁹An explanation of the military intervention in Lebanon can be found in Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, pp. 105-121, and in Tanter, *Who's at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon*.

⁷⁰See Haass, op. cit., p. 23.

⁷¹See Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, op. cit., p. 105.

⁷²An explanation of the military intervention in Panama can be found in Grant, *Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process*, in Haass, op. cit., pp. 30-31, in Flanagan, *Battle for Panama*, in Schraeder, *Intervention into the 1990s*, pp. 343-360, and in National Defense University, 'Chapter 13: Limited Military Intervention', *Strategic Assessment 1996*, pp. 9-10.

⁷³See Grant, op. cit., p. 38.

⁷⁴See Flanagan, op. cit., p. 228.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 226.

⁷⁶See Haass, op. cit., p. 108.

⁷⁷An explanation of the military intervention in the Gulf War can be found in Nye and Smith, eds., *After the Storm*, in McCausland, *The Gulf Conflict*, in Haass, op. cit., pp. 31-35, in Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, and in Schraeder, *Intervention into the 1990s*, pp. 321-342.

⁷⁸See Nye, op. cit., p. 288.

⁷⁹See McCausland, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

⁸⁰An explanation of the military intervention in Somalia can be found in Clark, 'Debacle in Somalia' reprinted in Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint*, pp. 204-240, in Bolton, 'Wrong Turn in Somalia', *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 57-65, and in Mandelbaum, 'The Reluctance to Intervene', *Foreign Policy*, pp. 3-18.

⁸¹See Clark, op. cit., p. 223.

⁸²Grigg, 'Follow the Leader', *The New American*.

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